What theorists of the imaginary have not done is make specific connections between the ontological background of social imaginaries and the normative utterance. This lacuna has left them vulnerable to the charges of "normative deficit" and vagueness that Habermas and others famously make against philosophies of "world disclosure." 4 To be sure, philosophers of the imaginary are careful to supplement third-person accounts of political culture with phenomenological descriptions; however, when theorists of the imaginary move from the
common background provided by imaginaries to the first-and second person, the focus is usually on the imagination as a faculty rather than on the new conception of the normative utterance and political dialogue that follows from an understanding of the social imaginary. 5 I will consider the relationship of social imaginaries to individual utterances so that we do not have the individual imagination set against the social context, but the utterance as reproducing and/or intervening in the imaginary structures. In this view, normativity is not expressed in the propositional form of the Rawlsian or Habermasian justification, but through a complex engagement with the worldhood that informs normative judgments. Looking at the normative utterance through the lens of social imaginaries enables us to engage the background structures that subtend discrete utterances, and this engagement requires richer forms of argument than what we find in constructivist or realist conceptions of normativity. framework not by analyzing a principle of justice but by displaying the unacknowledged conflicts in the imaginary, conflicts that go unrecognized by whites and that blacks struggle to articulate. He writes in the form of a letter to his son, in which he deploys various kinds of discourse--phenomenological description, narrative, and sociological generalization--to give a portrait of racial division in contemporary American life. In addressing the imaginary, Coates reveals the failure of our current language of facts and norms.
Thrownness and Social Imaginaries
In the hermeneutic perspective initiated by Heidegger, we are thrown into the world, into social imaginaries so that morality builds on norms that are already in place, on norms which are not constructed. In other words, normativity emerges through the social imaginary in a way that is logically prior to the conceptual formulations of ethical and political philosophy. 6 What Taylor and the other philosophers of the imaginary cited above have done is take this transcendental hermeneutic point made by Heidegger and Gadamer about worldhood and refined the historiography with the help of work by historians and sociologists in order to examine the emergence and modification of particular collective historical shapes. Taylor says, "The social imaginary is not a set of ideas;" rather, the imaginary forms the background that makes sense of "the practices of a society […Thus,] the notion of a moral order goes beyond some proposed schedule of norms that ought to govern our mutual relations and/or political life
[…] The image of order carries not only a definition of what is right, but of the context in which it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right." 7 The social imaginary concerns the ways that "ordinary people 'imagine' their social surroundings and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms but in images, stories, legends, etc…. The social imaginary is that common understanding which makes possible common practices and widely shared sense of legitimacy." 8 These imaginaries form the background out of which we think and act but "which we do not entirely understand. To ascribe total personal responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out of the human condition." 9 Such a conception of normativity demands a very different form of questioning than the constructivist approach. In understanding and defending normative claims, we must locate ourselves in the space of historical imaginaries and argue through these imaginaries rather than
finding principles to which all should agree. Hence, "the task of reason is to articulate this background, what we presuppose when we make a judgment that a certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement." 10 These are the conditions of intentionality. 11 We can see the relationship of the ontological background (the political) to politics in Taylor's work by looking quickly at A Secular Age. At the beginning of A Secular Age, he distinguishes three kinds of secularism. The concerns of philosophers of public reason are placed in "Secularity 1," which focuses on the retreat of religion from the common institutions and practices "most obviously, but not only, the state." 12 This is the normative, political secularism of public reason that addresses controversies such as the wearing of headscarves to school or the display of religious symbols on state grounds. A second sense of secularity refers to the decline of religious belief and practice-people no longer going to church, synagogue or mosque, for instance. This sociological approach is often called "secularization." The third and most important sense of secularity for Taylor concerns the shift in "the conditions of belief" since this sense gives a place to the ontological history he finds important. In this view, the "shift to secularity consists of a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and unproblematic to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace." 13 In other words, Taylor wants to examine the shift "which takes us from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believers, is one possibility among others." 14 Taylor To get oriented to the world and our place in it requires more than abstract principles-such as "the separation of church and state"-for they block out the massive background that shapes reasoning.
Normativity cannot swing free from contestable historical accounts of how our selfunderstandings came about because it is woven from specific social imaginaries. Hence, Taylor wants to begin reasoning by reopening the assumptions of modernity and displaying the complex, conflicted historical inheritance that lies behind current usage.
The articulation of background social imaginaries brings in the third-person point of view that is excluded by the constructivist view, and it joins up with Taylor's long-standing objection to such theories of practical reason because they "cannot articulate the background understanding surrounding any conviction that we ought not act in this or that way." 19 However, we need to distinguish two kinds of articulations or "world disclosures" that Taylor sometimes conflates.
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On the one hand, there is articulation "of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves," 21 and, on the other hand, there is the utterance, the "reflective disclosure." The articulation of background is concerned with our passive relationship to structures of intelligibility, such as we find in Taylor Taylor focuses his attention on the Heideggerian point-that logical forms of language depend upon a background-rather than connecting background and normativity into an adequate conception of language and argument. In theorizing the individual utterance, Taylor makes a move that is all too typical of both defenders and critics of world disclosure by defining disclosure against everyday speech and normativity. In lumping together various aesthetic works and ignoring the disclosive power of everyday language, he fails to address the normative claims of "disclosive" writing that could answer disclosure's critics. It is one thing to respect the insights provided by literary language: "We delude ourselves if we think a philosophical or critical language is somehow more hard-edged and more free from personal index than that of poets or novelists;" 33 however, it is another to give literature blanket insight beyond challenge, ignoring the ways that literature can often be misleading, repulsive, or just stupid. By giving literature this vatic status, he gives weight to Christina Lafont's charge (cited in note 2 above) that "world disclosure seems unrevisable from within and inaccessible from without," a charge to which I will respond directly. 34 Taylor follows the German hermeneutic tradition here, in placing art, particularly poetry, against prose and everyday speech. Wolf Lepenies notes that "the antithesis of literature and poetry has been maintained in all its severity only in Germany, where it has been exacerbated through an asociality of poetical production in principle, that even sees its chief task as being the 'refutation of the social.'" 35 Gadamer, for instance, for all his emphasis on dialogue, still gives art privileged disclosive access to our being in the world in a way that exempts art from normative claims: "Prior to all conceptual scientific knowledge, the way in which we look upon the world, and upon our whole being-in-the-world, takes shape in art." 36 Gadamer opposes poetry and philosophy to everyday language: "Poetry and philosophy are both set off from the exchange of language as it takes place in practical activity and in science."
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The opposition of poetry and prose has meant hostility to the distinctive genre of modernity, the novel. The novel is attentive to the dynamic interplay of the multiple languages of public life, languages ignored by Heidegger and Gadamer. Taylor views the novel mostly through a sociological lens, in which the novel helps shape the modern sense of space and time and helps establish the dignity of everyday life (Sources of the Self, Part III). The language of literature is a poetic language for Taylor, a language tied to the search for spiritual significance, not to its relevance to public, normative debates. Much of his discussion of disclosure has a religious character to it, and we can see this in his emphasis on the connection between disclosure and epiphanic poetry in Sources of the Self and his emphasis on "fullness" in A Secular Age.
In his new book, The Language Animal, the closest he comes to connecting imaginaries and normativity is when he discusses "accessive" and "existential" disclosure.
Accessive disclosures "open a new range of phenomena to us, for instance terms to classify animals or trees." 38 Existential disclosure offers "a new way of describing, or a new model for understanding, our human condition and the alternatives it opens for us…..We may come to this existential insight through meeting, or hearing about, some paradigmatic figure (the Buddha, St.
Francis), or by reading a book about ethics or the meaning of life or (more often) by seeing a film." 39 Existential disclosures are made available through the language of "portrayal" rather than the language of assertion-e.g., Dostoevsky's Devils (78) . A "portrayal can be an alternative way of offering models to understand human life, alternative, that is to description." 40 He calls this mode "regestalting," but this way of talking takes away any argumentative or normative claim. In my view, such "regestalting" can be understood as normative revision that can play on the same field with principled argument. In addition, Taylor blocks out the power of imaginaries to shape the concepts, with which they are imbricated. When speaking of the interaction of concepts and imaginaries, he speaks of concepts "trickling down" into imaginaries but does not examine the ways that imaginaries shape concepts:
When a theory penetrates and transforms the social imaginary…, people take up, or are inducted into new practices. These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first articulated in theory…but this process isn't just one sided; a theory making over a social imaginary. The theory in coming to make sense of the action is glossed, as it were, given a particular shape as the context of these practices. Rather like Kant's notion of an abstract category becoming 'schematized' when it is applied to reality in space and time, the theory is schematized in the dense sphere of common practice. For all the richness of his two most recent books, The Language Animal and Retrieving Realism, Taylor never moves to integrate his views on language with social imaginaries. In fact, the idea of social imaginaries never appears in these works. 43 These works are complex and interesting-I can hardly summarize them here-but they say nothing to contradict the critique I have advanced. In my view, social imaginaries inform our most basic practical engagements with the world and their relationship to particular utterances can be made visible and provide a space for a new conception of disclosure and practical reasoning.
Reasoning through the Social Imaginary in Glaspell's "A Jury of Her Peers"
Susan Glaspell's short story "A Jury of Her Peers" (1917) offers a phenomenology of interpretation in a straightforward everyday language that opens the boundaries of art and everyday speech and shows how narratives can make normative arguments. The story dramatizes a "world historical" shift in the normative imaginary of gender, a shift that goes far beyond the formal political inclusion of women through the extension of the principle of equality, which was achieved three years after the story was published through the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
The title of the story alludes to the debates that preceded its passage.
The tale begins when Mrs. Hale is called from her work in the kitchen to join her husband, Mr. Peters (the sheriff), and his wife. Mrs. Hale, the center of focalization for the thirdperson narrative, learns that Mr. Wright, the husband of an old friend, has been killed. The sheriff suspects that Mrs. Hale's friend Minnie has killed her husband. The group proceeds to the Wrights' home, where it splits up. The men go out to the barn to look for evidence that can establish a motive for Minnie, while the women wait in the kitchen. While sitting there, they encounter the "text" of Minnie's life-the dirty towels, the mishandled stitching on her quilt, the act of violence of which she is suspected, and so on. That is, the dominant tradition that the women bring to Minnie's house, a tradition that they share with their husbands, forms preunderstandings that do not help them reconstitute the self-understanding of the text. The men have called Minnie "mad," and the women at this point can articulate no other reading, even though they sense that more is at stake here for them.
Slowly the women start to put together an explanation of the strangeness of Minnie's text-the systematic psychological torture to which her husband subjected her, a torture that culminated in the strangulation of Minnie's double, her pet bird. The process of coming to this explanation forces them to transform the understandings of their own lives and indeed the gendered imaginaries of the time. Minnie's text asks them disturbing questions, not just the other way around.
They discover that Minnie's husband was not just "a cruel man" but also a typical one and that Minnie's response differs only in degree, not in kind, from the ones they have had but Unlike Minnie, they are able to create a way of speaking that unites them with each other and separates them from the men. They have formed a powerful normative language that gives them reasons to do something they never could have imagined before they arrived at the Wrights' house. They have created a "new space of reasons," to use Sellars's famous phrase. 46 The story implicitly takes a stance with regard to existing imaginaries and in doing so creates its own space in which existing norms are engaged and modified.
Their interpretations open a new, hitherto unthinkable space of action: they choose to hide the bird (conceal evidence), betray their husbands, and break the law. There is nothing ineffable about this disclosure, but the reasons of the argument do not appear in terms of the principles of public reason, such as justice and equality. Certainly, such notions inform the background, but these conceptual principles are woven into the textures of their shared imaginaries. Indeed, concepts and imaginaries worked together to form an imprisoning discursive package that Minnie's text calls into question and pushes them to revise. The thirdperson narrator articulates the new space of understanding that emerges for them without ever reducing it to a conceptual label. In Mimesis 1, Ricoeur drives a wedge between narrative and experience in the world at the same time that he freezes the historical and dialogical character of language and literature.
Ricoeur does not place the subject in language and narratives so that inchoate narratives already inform experience. To be sure, Ricoeur acknowledges that history and fiction "are preceded by the use of narrative in daily life." 49 However, "prefiguration" is a cognitive capacity that stands against the experience of time, which in itself is "confused, unformed, and, at the limit, mute." what Kant says about the operation of judging." 52 Emplotment "extracts configuration from a succession" in the same that way that a reflective judgment "reflects upon the work of thinking at work in the aesthetic judgment of taste and the teleological judgment applied to organic wholes." 53 In a stroke, Ricoeur has reduced the author's engagement with worth and truth of the languages of social imaginaries to a formal aestheticism. 54 Thus, when he says that emplotment is the "synthesis of the heterogeneous"-that is, "the diverse mediations performed by the plot:
between the manifold of events and the temporal unity of the story recounted between the disparate components of the action" 55 narrative identity are put to the test of narration." 57 We are now ready for a very different example of how arguing through the social imaginary works, one that does not narrate the transition from one normative framework to another; instead, we see an aggressive confrontation of a dominant imaginative framework by alternative.
Obama and the Discursive Constraints of Racial Politics
I will begin with Barack Obama's famous "race speech," "A More Perfect Union," and show the ways that it is tied to the discursive form of normativity laid down by Brown v. Board.
I then examine how the work of Ta-Nehisi Coates exposes the ways this discursive form protects the majority from addressing the normative demands of African Americans.
When Obama himself addressed questions of race in his speeches, his language and reasoning were tied to the normative model of constitutional principles applied to particular situations, and this model harbors within it the tradition of silence on race that began with the gag orders prior to the Civil War. The model was given its modern discursive form in Brown v.
Board of Education. 58 In this argument for the American conception of equality, an admirable principle was bound with certain discursive constraints that occlude the world that Ta-Nehesi
Coates, and his predecessors, such as Ralph Ellison, tried to expose. During the Brown deliberations, Chief Justice Earl Warren gave explicit recommendations to the other justices on the language of the decision: It "should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, nonaccusatory." 59 The Brown decision was not only shaped by the silence about the perpetrators of racist acts, but by three other features of the discursive landscape. One was the way social scientific evidence was gathered and used. Brown's famous footnote 11 to Kenneth Clark's research,
showing that adolescent black girls preferred white dolls to black ones, and to Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma. Both were used to establish the "damage hypothesis" and the language of victimhood as the appropriate lenses for addressing race. While these languages may have been effective in breaking down legal segregation, they were also effective in reinforcing condescension and inequality. The white majority could treat blacks as an object of pity, an approach that did little to challenge their own self-understanding. The American imagination could not conceive of injustice without victims, and whites did not recognize that they, not just African Americans, were damaged by racism. This disempowering condescension can be seen in the structure of many "progressive" literary works, such as To Kill a Mockingbird, in which we see black characters only from the point of view of whites, only as the objects of pity. The fact that this work served as a racial epiphany for many whites reveals how "recognizing" the evils of segregation can, at the same time, reinforce domination and misrecognition. The third feature of the hegemonic American imagination was interest convergence-that is, blacks gained social justice primarily when their interests converged with the interests of the white majority. 62 At the time of Brown, as is well-known, the United States' racial practices were a source of embarrassment in the Cold War because they undermined America's image abroad. 63 These forces joined the first two elements mentioned to push the court and other elites to support desegregation without recognizing African American's autonomy or their voices. Interest convergence was not just a sociological phenomenon of domination; it became part of a discursive form that systematically silenced other forms of writing and living.
These three dimensions of American society hardened into a gag rule that continues today not only for the court but for mainstream media, though not for African American media, the black public sphere, and the black church. The mainstream media ignore these languages, for the most part, until such languages touch a person who is trying to succeed in the mainstream, such as a presidential candidate.
The exclusion of black voices from the mainstream media did not mean that African
Americans did not speak out. From the time of the Civil War, the black public sphere has split in many ways from the mainstream public sphere. 64 Black writers have taken up the political responsibility of writing in ways that challenge the dominant narratives of American public life.
The first writer to respond directly to Myrdal's book was Ralph Ellison, and he directed his attack at Myrdal's reading of black culture: "Myrdal sees Negro culture and personality simply as the product of a 'social pathology.'" While acknowledging that "Negro" culture has some undesirable features, Ellison insists in "An America Dilemma: A Review" that "there is much of great value and richness, which because it has been secreted by living and has made their lives more meaningful, Negroes will not willingly disregard." 65 Myrdal's misreadings lead him to assume that, in Ellison's words, "it is to the advantage of American Negroes as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white Americans." 66 For Ellison, neither white nor black culture can be affirmed in an unqualified way, for they are both damaged and imbricated in ways that go unnoticed: "What is needed in our country is not an exchange of pathologies but a change in the basis of society. This is a job which both Negroes and whites must perform together. In Negro culture there is much of value for America as a whole." 67 Reverend Wright's sermons were not part of a marginal, radical fringe. They were very well-known in the African American community and were even used as models for black divinity school. 70 The criticism of Wright by the media displayed not only ignorance of the genre but, more importantly, a willful ignorance of African American speech and writing, whose normative claims challenged the dominant white identities and the historical understandings that underpin them. Obama alludes to the fissure between the discursive universes of blacks and whites in his speech: "The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of Reverend Wright's sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour in American life occurs on Sunday morning." 71 The oblivion of whites to Reverend Wright's form of speech is symptomatic of widespread oblivion about the reality of black lives. "Black lives matter" not only when they are being profiled and tased-the focus of attention in the news media-but also when black people are speaking, acting, and laughing. 72 When people respond to the cry of "black lives matter" with "all lives matter," they are simply repeating the legacy of
Brown by offering an abstract normative principle while refusing to acknowledge the forceful normative structuring of American life.
Since black people appear in the collective imagination as a group that must be contained, pitied, and "helped" but never listened to, it is no wonder that Darren Wilson, the police officer in Ferguson, Missouri who shot the unarmed Michael Brown, told the jury that he shot Brown because he looked "like a demon," a force pushing back against the system. 73 When mainstream media finally paid attention, their only question was to ask how anyone running for president could listen to such words regularly rather than asking how responsible media could ignore so many voices that challenged their self-understanding and conception of the world.
In his speech following the release of Wright's sermons, Obama does give voice to the anger and disappointment of blacks, but he is careful to balance it with the feelings of unhappy whites. Moreover, Obama recasts the long and brutal history of systemic and institutionalized racism as mere moral lapses. 74 He must affirm his patriotism and distance himself from language such as Wright's by placing this language and its rage at a historical distance from the present:
"For the men and women of Reverend Wright's generation, the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years. That anger may not get expressed in public, in front of white coworkers and white friends. But it does find voice in the barbershop or the beauty shop or around the kitchen tables … and occasionally it finds voice in church on Sunday." 75 In order to support the notion of generational differences, as opposed to racial differences, Obama draws a parallel with his own white grandmother's occasional racist remarks.
Wright's comments, like the racism on the white side of Obama's own family, are like the racism of a family member of a previous generation, a problem we all have. We can criticize them, but we cannot "disown" them. 76 Moreover, he voices the anger of whites who do not feel that they have been privileged in a way that justifies affirmative action and other preferential treatments of African Americans. 77 Anger on both sides has proved "counterproductive" because the realization of all Americans' dreams is not a zero-sum game, in which realizing one dream comes at the expense of another. 78 He acknowledges that "disparities that exist between the African American community and the larger American community" and that "the inequalities passed on from an earlier generation suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow." 79 However, when it comes to blame, he is careful to balance his criticism of whites with criticisms of blacks. 80 Thus, when Obama notes that the Constitution "was ultimately unfinished. It was stained by this nation's original sin of slavery," he quickly adds that "the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our Constitution-a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the law." 81 From his beginning with "we the people" to his anecdote Empathy follows from the constructivist understanding of equality because it depends on the capacity of the individual subject to project himself/herself into another's life. Defining it succinctly as a successful attempt to "stand in somebody else's shoes and see through their eyes," Obama regards empathy not as an exceptional gesture but an organizing principle for ethical behavior and even a preferred way of being. 84 By cultivating our capacity for empathy, he says, we are forced beyond "our limited vision," making it possible to overcome what divides us, allowing us to "find common ground" even in the face of our sharpest disagreements. Obama makes empathy "the heart of my moral code" and "a guidepost for my politics" in The Audacity of Hope and in "A More Perfect Union." 85 He ends his speech with the story of Ashley, in which a black man draws inspiration from a young white woman. The model of empathy fits well with thinking of normativity as the application of constitutional principles since it is organized around equal respect and concern for individuals. But this way of understanding normativity has failed to come to grips with the transsubjective normative structuring of the world. We need to come to grips with this understanding of normativity if we are to bring into view the racial structuring of society.
Coates's Challenge to America's Dominant Racial Imaginary
Ta-Nehisi Coates's book has been looked on as a direct reply to Obama's discussions of race. 86 Coates makes this challenge not by a competing argument organized around principles of justice or equality. Instead, he reveals the normative languages that imprison African American lives, languages that include narratives, images, and characters. Against America's "progressive narrative" that Balkin identifies, Coates tells his son: "The entire narrative of this country argues against the truth of who you are." 87 To Coates, these structures are the tissues of rationalization that encase the subjectivity of a privileged group that Coates calls "the Dreamers," alluding to the subtitle of The Audacity of Hope: Reclaiming the American Dream, as well as other versions of this dream. The dreamers are a self-contained community that does not think of itself as a community, but whose inhabitants live in a distinctive normative universe. Because their privilege, empowerment, and normative insularity are invisible to them, this universe is the site for pronouncements about "justice" and "equality" for society as a whole.
To capture the self-understanding of the Dreamers, Coates cites Solzhenitsyn's wellknown remark that "to do evil a human being must first of all believe that what he's doing is good, or else that it's a well-considered act in conformity with natural law." Coates then comments: "This is the foundation of the Dream-its adherents must not just believe in it but believe that it is just, believe that their possession of the dream is the natural result of grit, honor, and good works. There is a passing acknowledgment of the bad old days, which, by the way,
were not so bad as to have any ongoing effect on our present. The mettle that it takes to look away from the horror of our prison system, from police forces transformed into armies, from the long war against the black body, is not forged overnight. This is the practiced habit." 88 Constitutional principles cannot root out inequality for it is woven into the language of the Dreamers' world. No thought experiment can lift a Dreamer out of this world or bring an outsider in. A Dreamer cannot empathize with the kind of life Coates is describing because the Dreamer needs a new framework for understanding normativity so that the "facts" of a nondreamer's life can appear. Coates is not appealing to a politics of identity but thematizing the ontological force of the reigning normative order. 89 Thus, when he speaks of the police violence and of talk about sensitivity training, he is dismissive because such localization of the problem misses the point. It is not the police who commit the crimes but the American people locked in the dreamer imaginary: "The truth is that the police reflect America in all of its will and fear, and whatever we might make of this country's criminal justice policy, it cannot be said that it was imposed by a repressive minority.
The abuses that have followed from these policies-the sprawling carceral state, the random detentions of black people, the torture of suspects-are the product of democratic will." 90 Coates's language is at once descriptive and normative. He wants to make clear that the dominant collective imagination of most whites and many blacks provides a framework in which criminality is understood, a framework that is not shared by minorities. He calls this framework the product of "will" in order to insist on the collective intentionality at work here. 91 Coates's argument here works in a very different way than we find in much legal and political theory on race, which, for my purposes here, can be conveniently divided into antidiscrimination and antidomination approaches. The antidiscrimination argument maintains that the law should be colorblind. 92 The antisubordination thesis, on the other hand, argues that there are large patterns of racial subordination made available through sociological analysis, patterns that the antidiscrimination thesis systematically occludes by focusing on the intentions behind laws. Between the World and Me, by contrast, takes aim at the normative weight and shape of America's collective imagination that drives research in both of these popular conceptions but which is thematized by neither one. This is not to say that Coates's position is beyond challenge by any means. Rather, my point is that he provides a kind of normative argument that is unavailable by other approaches to normativity.
Coates's text is one in a long line of African American writings that have sought to shake readers loose from their frameworks. However, people do not give up frameworks easily, particularly frameworks of long standing such as the one which makes its reappearance yet again beneath the eloquence of Obama's speech, a reappearance that displays the contemporary form of America's continuing gag-order about race.
Conclusion
The ontological turn in political philosophy has offered important new approaches to the deep structures of past, present, and future societies. However, this line of thought has not produced a viable theory of the normative utterance that follows from this approach, leaving itself open to criticism for abstracting from the agency of particular actors and for adopting the ambiguous language of world disclosure. 93 In this essay, I have proposed a way of thinking about the relationship of background structures to particular utterances that expands the ways we think about normativity and argument. Rather than splitting off normative claims from sociological and narrative approaches to political philosophy, I propose to look at normativity from the perspective of social imaginaries, the ontological background structures of a given society. In this view, normativity is inflected by the particular shapes of forms of life but those shapes are never simply social facts; rather, they are the contestable background of speech and action into which we are thrown. Prior to questions of principle or fact are the ontological questions that emerge from social imaginaries and through which we orient ourselves in the world. We cannot point to the normativity of social imaginaries through the lens of constructivist theory or through the language of political realism for the context in question is not empirical nor ideal.
This ontological conception responds to the dilemmas that emerge in arguments between constructivists and realists. Realists complain that constructivist conceptions of normativity are detached from reality, while constructivists complain that realists and contextualists do not give an adequate place to normativity. 94 The ontological conception makes normativity historical and contextual but the context starts with the macro structures that make the world and normativity itself possible. In the work of Glaspell and Coates, we find not just concrete situations presented phenomenologically but also external description that engages the discursive structures that display the actors and their dilemmas. However, the texts do not just direct us to facts we already know; instead, they urge us to look at the background structures that make certain facts possible and that lock the characters in to their preconceptions-in "Jury," the women's understandings of gender, marriage, etc. and in Between the World and Me, the conflicting worlds of Dreamers and African Americans. In both texts, we saw how the understanding of normativity for a community at any given moment must understood not just as the slow emergence of macro structures imaginaries that we find in Taylor's analysis-public sphere, popular sovereignty, etc.,--which is done from great historical height with attention to longue durée, for this view implies that imaginaries are simply the nourishing background for principles or the shared background that makes debate possible. Instead, we need to attend to the language the texts use to bring our attention to the ways imaginaries feed ontological divisions within a political community, divisions that are covered over by the received understandings of both the real world and how it should be evaluated. As the texts make these structures surface through the phenomenological presentation of the characters, the reader is encouraged to connect them not by pointing to particular individuals-"I know someone just like that"-but to patterns, just as
Mrs. Peters finds in Minnie's text not only a parallel with her own life but an articulation of violence toward women that has been systematically silenced by the structures of the imaginary.
These structures are both realistic and normative since they make possible what world is available and the assessment of this world. 95 Normative argument relies on bringing aspects of the world into view, not only on the application of principles.
In a similar way, Coates's Between the World and Me attacks the dominant American framework for understanding race for its failure to grasp the structures of black life, structures that are brought out through a phenomenological narrative. Coates's argument reveals insulating moral narratives-including constitutional ones--that protect the majority from facing the cruelty that is reproduced daily. Coates shows that the failure to understand is at once epistemic and normative, a house of privilege that is invisible to the inhabitants at the same time that it makes those outside invisible. Coates is being "realistic," but he is not presenting sociological facts and then arguing for why these facts indicate injustice. Rather, he is striking at the ontology that and norms and at the same time provide resources for their revision. 97 However, arguments through the imaginary can also be done at the level of macro background history, such as we see in the competing accounts of secularity in the work of Taylor, Gauchet, Michael Allen Gillespie, and Mark Lilla. 98 These arguments seek to change the background history, which, in turn, will affect many local debates. The problematic of the social imaginary enables us to understand that the normative utterance cannot be hived off from the worldhood of the world and that normativity is woven into the imaginary. The normative utterance is first and foremost an engagement with the languages and practices of the social imaginary, for the background is logically prior to normative propositions and sociological explanations. This means that normative argument must concern itself with the articulation this background and the discursive structures through which it is instantiated and challenged. Such arguments will not be as neat as a Supreme Court decision, but they will give us a lot more to argue with and about than in thought experiments to produce principles. University Press, 1985), 36. I have substituted "secularity" for the "negotiation" in this wellknown passage from Taylor's work since he is making the same point with secularity. 17 Rawls gives his famous capsule summary of the background to liberalism in the introduction to Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), "Thus, the historical of origin of political liberalism…is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (xxiv).
20 "World Disclosure" is a translation of Heidegger's various terms "Erschlossenheit,"
"Lichtung" and "Ereignis." Taylor uses the notion of disclosure because "we can't turn the background against which we think into an object for us. The task of reason has to be conceived differently, disclosing what it involves." Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1997), 12.
21 Nikolas Kompridis makes this important distinction: "World disclosure refers, with deliberate ambiguity, to a process which actually occurs at two different levels. At one level, it refers to the disclosure of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves. At another level, it refers as much to the disclosure of new horizons of meaning as to the disclosure of previously hidden or unthematized dimensions of meaning." "On World Disclosure, Heidegger, Habermas, and Dewey," in Thesis Eleven (1994), 37. additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses" (11) . 26 Taylor, "Language Not Mysterious," Reading Brandom, 43.
27 Taylor, "Language Not Mysterious," 43. 28 Taylor, "Language not Mysterious," 43.
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First, a reflective judgment (somehow) makes or finds the determinate rule that articulates [a] concept. Then, and only then, can that concept be applied in the determinate judgments and maxims that are the ultimate subject of the first two Critiques" "Some Pragmatist Themes in for a critique of the "social weightlessness" of the ontological turn in politics. 94 Geuss says that a realist will "start from an account of our existing motivations and our 
